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the king’s request to express his beliefs in universal terms (I:11,25;
Heinemann trans.):
I believe in the God of Abraham, Isaac and Israel, who led
the Israelites out of Egypt with
signs and miracles; who fed
them in the desert and gave
them the (Holy) Land…who
sent Moses with His Law, and
subsequently thousands of
prophets, who confirmed His
law by promises to those who
observed and threats to the disobedient…
In the same way God commenced His speech to the assembled people of Israel: “I am
the God whom you worship,
who hath led you out of the land
of Egypt”; He did not say “I am
the Creator of the world and
your Creator.” In the same style
I spoke to thee, O Prince of the
Khazars, when thou didst ask
me about my creed.
In other words, Halevi does not
deny that Judaism is a religion containing dogmas, but he does deny
that these dogmas are to be found
in abstract philosophical principles.
It is precisely for this reason that I
cited Halevi’s discussion in
III:17―to demonstrate that even
the anti-philosophy school represented by Halevi accepts that Judaism is a religion defined by specific
beliefs, and that this is not a Maimonidean innovation. (For a good
overview of the dispute between
Rambam and Halevi about the merits of philosophy, see R. Sheilat’s

Bein ha-Kuzari la-Rambam, pp. 13–
36. R. Sheilat explains his translation decision which upsets Kellner
on p. 28 n. 26. I used R. Sheilat’s
translation because I believe it to be
the most accurate one available, despite Prof. Kellner’s aspersions. As
it happens, on the relevant line in
III:17, R. Kafih’s translation is virtually identical: ומי שאמר את כל אלה
 הרי הוא ישראלי באמת,בכוונה גמורה.)

Divine Providence and
Free Will
I WRITE IN RESPONSE to the erudite
and informative article of Dr. Alan
Kadish on the reconciliation of
G-d’s intervention in the natural
world with a mechanistic view of
the universe and its physical laws.
Specifically, Dr. Kadish refers to the
work of Dr. Nicolas Saunders, who
raises issues concerning the recognition of Special Divine Action
(SDA) within the laws of the cosmos. Dr. Kadish similarly examines
the issue of a deterministic universe
with regard to Judaism’s resolution
of the issue of man’s free will in a
universe determined by the will of
the Almighty.
While Dr. Kadish provides a scientific model for so-called SDAs,
he does not fully address the scientific issues regarding determinism
and free-will or free-choice. While
some of Dr. Kadish’s insights (such
as recent developments concerning
quantum theory) would be applicable to free will, it would be most
useful if a further article exploring
scientific issues regarding free will
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would be forthcoming. These are
two very different models of determinism, but the resolution of free
action in a deterministic system is
similar. This is an ever more important issue today as scientists are
attempting to create a neuro-physical model of brain activity. Man’s
actions in affecting (and undermining) the stability of earth’s eco-system is well-accepted by many scientists. Understanding man’s free will
would obviously also address questions on the determinism of natural
laws, since mankind by its actions
interacts with the world in potentially profound ways.
With regard to the overall issues
raised by Dr. Saunders, I had the
following general comments:
While the world may seem deterministic to a philosopher or a
physicist (or a mathematician, for
that matter) examining equations, a
human being living on earth experiences the world around him or her
as very much a non-deterministic
one, a world in which seemingly
random events occur, many predictable but others surprising or
even seemingly miraculous. Mathematicians can predict the likely outcome of the repetition of independent random events using what they
call the “Law of Large Numbers.”
While there are various theories regarding the origin of statistical consistency and the ultimate randomness of these events, all agree that
certain events follow probabilistic
patterns. These probabilistic laws
do not dictate the outcome of individual events, and, although the
probability of long term deviation

from the mean can be measured,
these deviations occur with a measurable probability. Special Divine
Action, which we call “hashgacha pratis,” individual providence, can easily occur within these seemingly
random events, and believing Jews
experience such providence, without expecting that this providence
would violate the natural order of
the universe. These are included
within the Modim prayer, recited
thrice daily, wherein we thank the
Almighty “… v-al nisecho sheb’chol yom
imonu (and for the miracles that occur every day…).”
Both the Bible and halacha
assert that nissim, miracles beyond
the everyday, can occur even in our
own era. The blessing of “she’oso
nissim (Who made miracles…”),
recited on both Chanukah and
Purim, seeks to publicize the
miracles of both of those events,
which are valued equally as
miraculous, although the miracle of
Purim may be a nes nistar, a hidden
miracle. These miracles involved
not only the burning of oil beyond
the expected time limit, but
battlefield victories and political
decisions ultimately deciding the
fate of the Jewish people.
The halacha also seeks to define
the circumstances for which one
can recite the individual blessing
“she’oso li nes ba’makom ha’zeh (Who
made a miracle for me in this
place)” on individual miraculous
events. According to some halachic
decisors, we would need a miracle
beyond normal human experience
to recite such a blessing, but not an
experience to overrule the laws of
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the cosmos. The Halacha asserts
that we can and need to recognize Special Divine Action, even if
such would not be recognized by
Dr. Saunders.
As a final observation, even if
the “equations” governing the
physical universe were such as to
provide unique solutions, and thus
to determine future results,
knowledge of these results would
be predicated on perfect knowledge
of initial conditions. Precisely because the equations of complex systems such as those governing
weather conditions are unstable and
heavily sensitive to changes in initial
conditions, chaotic systems arise
that are extremely difficult to predict on a long-term basis. Humankind’s knowledge is far from perfect; as Dr. Kadish rightly points
out, the Heisenberg Uncertainty
principle may even set forth some
absolute limits on what can be physically known, since measurement itself may interfere in the process and
make it impossible to measure momentum and position simultaneously. Chazal tell us, “Ain habrocho
shoruy eleh b’dovor hasomuy min ha-ayin
(Blessings can reside only in material that is hidden from the eye).”
Much of human experience is, indeed, hidden from human eyes, our
actual measurement (if not the Almighty’s), and it is there that blessings and Special Divine Action can
take place.
Principles generally germane to
the interface of science and religion
are reviewed by the Rashba in a
teshuva (Shu”t Rashba [1:9]). The

Rashba is asked concerning an assertion he had made, based on Talmudic sources that Chazal believed
that the world would cease to exist
at the end of 6000 years, a position
refuted by Maimonides. In this
teshuva, the Rashba, interestingly
enough, appears somewhat sympathetic to the position of Maimonides as to the reinterpretation of
medrashic, or even biblical, texts
when they come into conflict with a
naturalistic physical worldview.
However, Rashba asserts, such a leniency in interpretation needs to
have limits, even for Maimonides,
when it conflicts with accepted doctrines and beliefs derived from revelation. Revelation or prophecy represents a higher-level wisdom, as
opposed to the scientific wisdom
derived from human “hakirah (investigation).” Rashba maintains that
the potential end of the universe is
an accepted kabbalah or received
tradition among the Jewish people.
On the matter of the eternity of
the universe, Rashba understands
well that science, based on its own
understanding of the natural order,
its observations of the stars and
planets conducting their ordered
rounds, and the world following its
formulas and determined ways,
would not agree with the concept of
a sudden end to the universe. (Curiously, thanks to advances in scientific knowledge, we can now more
easily conceive of a catastrophic end
to human existence than ever before.) Rashba points, however, to
the differences in methodology and
philosophy of scientific wisdom,
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derived solely from its own observations and denying any other avenue of truth but its own, and rejecting the potential for G-d’s intervention in nature such as the splitting
of the sea, the giving of the Torah,
or other miracles.
A constant of Jewish theology is
that the Almighty and His Chochma
(wisdom) are one and the same.
Since the Almighty cannot be totally
known, neither can the Chochma, by
which He orders the universe, be
totally understood. Our knowledge
of the universe, dictated by our own
finite understanding, is therefore
limited. To this end, Rashba points
to the incompleteness of man’s scientific knowledge of the world, using the phenomena of magnetism as
an example. No doubt, Aristotle, if
merely told about magnetism,
would have rejected it as impossible, as a phenomenon he could not
explain based on a materialistic interpretation of the universe. Once
magnetism was demonstrated, Aristotle worked to develop a theory for
magnetic action. (One is reminded
of Einstein’s characterization of
gravity as “spooky action at a distance” and his own efforts to explain it.)
Rashba argues that Judaism, too,
incorporates additional axioms,
based on its revealed knowledge of
the Almighty, to explain that G-d,
the Creator, may intervene in nature
to preserve the natural order or to
change it. Therefore, the Rashba asserts, even a scientist such as Maimonides recognizes that the wisdom of the Almighty is greater than

that of humankind, and that doctrine takes precedence over our
knowledge derived from the natural
order. Finally, Rashba reminds us
that science is always subject to
change, that Plato disproved philosophers before him, and that Aristotle subsequently rejected the teachings of Plato. Therefore a healthy
skepticism for the claims of science
needs to accompany anyone in
seeking to address scientific criticism of religious doctrine.
Dr. Kadish has shown us how to
incorporate the opportunity for
Hashem’s actions even within the
scientific world-view of natural
causation. We need to be aware that
science itself is never complete, and
that there always is a time and need
and potential for Special Divine
Action.
Stanley Boylan
VP Undergraduate Education
Dean of Faculties, Touro College
I ENJOYED the interesting article
“God, Man, Chaos and Control:
How God Might Control the Universe” by Dr. Alan Kadish (Ḥakirah
volume 20), which considers the apparent conflict between divine
providence and free will. I would
like to comment on this article, and
also add something to what I wrote
on this subject, in “Divine Providence and Natural Forces: Conflict
or Harmony” (Ḥakirah 19).
The author asserts (pp. 124–
128) that “Attempts to reconcile
providence and free will in the Jewish intellectual tradition essentially

